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DESERT, DEONTOLOGY, AND VENGEANCE
Youngjae Lee*
In a series of recent writings, Paul Robinson has defended "empirical
desert" as the way of deriving distributive principles for determining who
should be punished and by how much.' "Empirical desert" has two principal
dimensions: methodological and instrumental. As a methodological matter,
Robinson defines "empirical desert" as assessments of the blameworthiness
of offenses "determined through social science research into peoples'
shared intuitions of justice."2 The way Robinson sees it, "empirical desert"
is valuable as an instrument for fighting crime because when the criminal
law more or less accurately reflects shared intuitions of justice, "the law
gains access to the power and efficiency of stigmatization, it avoids the
resistance and subversion inspired by an unjust system, it gains compliance
by prompting people to defer to it as a moral authority in new or grey areas.
*.,and it earns the ability to help shape powerful societal norms."3
Desert is, of course, an idea with a long history, and its precise role in
criminal law has been much debated.4 In addressing various criticisms of
desert in criminal law, Robinson distinguishes empirical desert from what
he calls "deontological desert" and "vengeful desert."5 According to
Robinson, "deontological desert," unlike "empirical desert," is derived
"from the arguments and analyses of moral philosophy," 6 and "vengeful
desert" is "associated with the victim's perspective,"7 unlike empirical
desert, which focuses on "the blameworthiness of the offender."8
* Visiting Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law; Associate Professor of Law,
Fordham University School of Law.
1. See, e.g., PAUL H. ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW: WHO
SHOULD BE PUNISHED How MUCH? 4, 110-11 (2008) [hereinafter ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE
PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW]; Paul H. Robinson, Empirical Desert, in CRIMINAL LAW
CONVERSATIONS 29, 31 (Paul H. Robinson et al. eds., 2009) [hereinafter Robinson, Empirical
Desert]; Paul H. Robinson, Competing Conceptions of Modern Desert: Vengeful,
Deontological, and Empirical, 67 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 145, 149 (2008) [hereinafter Robinson,
Competing Conceptions].
2. Robinson, Empirical Desert, supra note 1, at 29.
3. ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 1, at 140.
4. See, e.g., David Dolinko, Some Thoughts About Retributivism, 101 ETHICS 537 passim
(1991).
5. Robinson, Competing Conceptions, supra note 1, at 146.
6. Id. at 148.
7. Id. at 147.
8. Id. at 149.
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Robinson's strategy, which I call "divide and deflect," fights off various
objections traditionally leveled against the use of desert in criminal law by
arguing that most of those objections may be valid for "deontological" and
"vengeful" desert but are not applicable to "empirical desert." So, for
instance, "vengeful desert" can be too harsh, may be based on anger and
hatred, and give only vague guidance, and "deontological desert" judgments
may be too contested to be useful for policy makers, but, Robinson claims,
empirical desert suffers from no such defects.9
As I will explain further below, I am sympathetic to Robinson's view
that the criminal law's desert judgments should be "empirical" at least in
the sense that they should closely resemble ordinary intuitions of desert.
Also, in principle, I have nothing against using social scientific research as
at least one way of getting at such ordinary intuitions.10 Neither do I have
any quarrel with the idea that there are crime-control benefits to derive from
having the criminal law conform to ordinary moral intuitions." Therefore, I
am in substantial, albeit not complete, agreement with Robinson's core
claims. I have, however, some reservations about how he arrives at them,
especially the ways in which he dismisses some of the other "competing
conceptions of desert" along the way. In the end, I am doubtful that the
option of taking only what is attractive and leaving out what is unattractive
from desert is as available as Robinson appears to think it is.
Let me start by saying a few things about Robinson's use of the words
"empirical" and "deontological." To the extent that the word "empirical" is
used to distinguish Robinson's preferred type of desert from other types of
desert, the word is highly misleading. The problem lies in the ambiguity of
the term, which could mean something as general as "based on experience"
or something narrower, as in "empirical studies," which is a phrase used to
designate academic approaches that are primarily characterized by
observations and laboratory experiments as opposed to theories. Robinson
rightly points out that many working in the area of criminal law theory rely
on "philosophical analyses""2 as a way of exploring various moral issues
raised by criminal law doctrines, and those scholars are properly
characterized as "not doing empirical work." However, calling the output of
9. Id. at 156-73.
10. Cf Youngjae Lee, The Constitutional Right Against Excessive Punishment, 91 VA. L.
REv. 677, 716 n. 170 (2005).
11. Cf H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF
LAW 25 (2d ed. 2008) ("[M]aintenance of proportion... may be important: for where the legal
gradation of crimes expressed in the relative severity of penalties diverges sharply from this
rough scale, there is a risk of either confusing common morality or flouting it and bringing the
law into contempt.").
12. Robinson, Competing Conceptions, supra note 1, at 145.
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their endeavors as something other than "empirical desert" also suggests
that "deontological" assessments of blameworthiness are not "based on
experience," which in turn makes the idea of "deontological desert" seem
completely nonsensical.
Take the crime of child molestation for instance. If you ask a randomly
selected desert theorist, "deontological" or not, what she thinks about
blameworthiness of child molestation, she will most likely have an opinion.
But in order to form a view about child molestation, one needs to know
something about what child molestation does to, or what effects it has on,
the victims and the society at large. Without such "empirical" knowledge,
as in knowledge based on experience, no desert judgment is possible. There
is no such thing as a purely non-"empirical" school of desert. Robinson, of
course, understands this, as he notes that, for example, "[t]he extent of the
harm caused or the seriousness of the evil done will be part of'
deontological desert's calculation of blameworthiness of an offender.'3 The
point here is merely that the word "empirical" may invite confusion along
the lines I suggested, even if Robinson himself does not suffer from such
confusion.
Robinson uses the word "empirical" also to highlight the fact that
"empirical desert" draws its content from "the community's intuitions of
justice."' 4 Robinson describes "deontological desert" as, in contrast, a
conception of desert that "transcends the particular people and situation at
hand," seeks to "produce justice without regard to political, social, or other
peculiarities of the situation at hand," and generates "moral judgments...
from the point of view of the universe."'" I cannot speak for every desert
theorist, but I must confess that I do not recognize what Robinson calls
"deontological desert" as desert at all.
In order to unpack this complaint, we need to start by asking what desert
is. As Joel Feinberg explained in his seminal discussion, desert statements
have the form, "S deserves X in virtue of F," where S is the person
deserving, X is what he deserves, and F is the desert basis, or whatever
serves as the basis for X.6 The relationship between X, what is deserved,
and F, the desert basis, is that of "fittingness" or "appropriateness."'
' 7
"Fittingness," in the punishment context, has two dimensions, type and
amount. First, when choosing how to respond to a criminal behavior, it
13. Id.
14. Id. at 149.
15. Id. at 148.
16. JOEL FEINBERG, Justice and Personal Desert, in DOING AND DESERVING: ESSAYS IN
THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY 55, 61 (1970).
17. Id. at 81-82.
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would be "fitting" or "appropriate" only if the response takes the form that
symbolizes or expresses the society's condemnatory attitude towards the
criminal conduct. 18 The second dimension of "fittingness," that of amount,
refers to the idea that the harshness of the punishment should reflect our
level of condemnation or disapproval. 9 What this means is that the validity
of desert judgments turns on appropriateness or fittingness of responses to
desert bases. Such assessment of appropriateness or fittingness, in turn, can
be made only within the context of a community of shared values.2" Given
such an expressive dimension of punishment, and what it expresses, it
would not make any sense to attempt to answer questions of who deserves
what without referring to the ways in which the relevant communities
would react to different kinds of stimuli that inspire praise and blame. The
idea of characterizing desert as "transcendent" seems to me almost like a
contradiction in terms for this reason. Of course, it may be that certain
desert judgments transcend boundaries in the sense that different
communities converge on them, but we would have to work from bottom up
to see whether there is in fact such a consensus on particular desert
questions,2' which is different from deriving concrete desert statements top-
down from general propositions of "right and good" from "the point of view
of the universe. 22
The terminological issues multiply when we come to his uses of the term
"deontological." As noted, Robinson distinguishes between "empirical
desert" and "deontological desert" on, among other things, methodological
grounds. But the word "deontological" is in general used to mark
substantive, not methodological, commitments. More specifically,
"deontology" commonly refers to a way of thinking about morality that
speaks in terms of moral rights and wrongs that are resistant to
consequentialist considerations about what would produce the best
outcome.23 In criminal law, the word "deontological" is commonly
18. Id. at 67-71; JOEL FEINBERG, The Expressive Function of Punishment, in DOING AND
DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 16, at 95, 98-99.
19. FEINBERG, supra note 18, at 118.
20. See R.A. DUFF, PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY 80 (2001); NICOLA
LACEY, STATE PUNISHMENT: POLITICAL PRINCIPLES AND COMMUNITY VALUES 176-77 (1988);
see also ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 250 (2d ed. 1984)
("[T]he notion of desert is at home only in the context of a community whose primary bond is a
shared understanding both of the good for man and of the good of that community and where
individuals identify their primary interests with reference to those goods.").
21. Cf Youngjae Lee, International Consensus as Persuasive Authority in the Eighth
Amendment, 156 U. PA. L. REv. 63, 99-110 (2007).
22. Robinson, Competing Conceptions, supra note 1, at 148.
23. See, e.g., SHELLY KAGAN, NORMATIVE ETHICS 70-78 (1998).
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associated with the view that people should not be punished more than they
deserve even if doing so would be socially beneficial.24
If we understand the term "deontological" in this substantive way, it is
perfectly coherent to treat assessments of blameworthiness from social
scientific studies-what Robinson calls "empirical desert"-as an aid to
implementing the deontological constraint that people should not be
punished more than they deserve. It is also perfectly coherent to treat
assessments of blameworthiness derived from philosophical theorizing-
what Robinson calls "deontological desert"-as a set of useful guidelines to
follow when designing a consequentialist punishment system. The problem
with Robinson's use of the phrase "deontological desert," then, is that it
suggests that other types of desert are necessarily consequentialist and that
"deontological desert" is necessarily deontological, when Robinson's
distinction of the two in methodological terms do not carry such
implications. My complaint is, again, not what Robinson believes or does
not believe but how Robinson's unusual use of the word "deontological" in
the methodological sense may lead one astray.
At the same time, by using the word "deontological," Robinson appears
to be gesturing at a substantive, not just methodological, difference between
"deontological desert" and "empirical desert." Robinson argues that, unlike
"deontological desert," "empirical desert" is not vulnerable to utilitarian
objections by pointing out that "empirical desert is a utilitarian,
consequentialist theory of punishment" and that empirical desert is
"specifically designed to minimize future crime-by harnessing the crime-
control power of social influence that comes with building the criminal
law's moral credibility."25 This answer does not quite settle the issue,
however, because it conflates the purpose of empirical desert with the
effects of empirical desert. If it turns out that the best way of "building the
criminal law's moral credibility" and "minimi[zing] future crime" is by
rigidly sticking to the principle that people should not be punished more
than they deserve, then the deontological approach would not be vulnerable
to utilitarian objections, and the fact that the deontological approach is
purely about "doing justice" and not about preventing crime should not
make a difference.26 On the other hand, if sticking to "the community's
intuitions of justice" in implementing empirical desert is at odds with
optimal crime prevention policies, then empirical desert, too, would be
24. See, e.g., Alice Ristroph, How (Not) to Think Like a Punisher, 61 FLA. L. REv. 727,
737-38 (2009).
25. Robinson, Competing Conceptions, supra note 1, at 167.
26. Id.
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vulnerable to utilitarian objections.27 Which scenario is closer to the truth is,
in fact, an empirical question.
Perhaps Robinson's point is rather that empirical desert, because it is a
consequentialist theory, is likely to be more flexible than "deontological
desert" and tolerate deviations from desert judgments when doing so would
be beneficial. If so, empirical desert would indeed be less vulnerable to
utilitarian objections than deontological desert, and perhaps this is the
substantive difference between the two conceptions of desert.
These issues may be largely semantic in that they arise from Robinson's
uses of various terms; however, the root of these terminological differences
can be traced to substantive considerations about the role of desert in
criminal law. As noted above, Robinson's strategy of divide and deflect
distinguishes "empirical desert" from "vengeful desert" and "deontological
desert," and defends "empirical desert" as not being vulnerable to
objections that "vengeful desert" and "deontological desert" face. I am not
sure whether these different conceptions of desert can or should be teased
apart this way. Ordinary intuitions, vengeance, and deontology go hand-in-
hand in this context, and separating them is likely to be not only artificial
and unsustainable, but also undesirable.
The reasons for my skepticism are as follows.2 8 First, as many have
argued, an important function that criminal law serves is to displace
feelings of resentment and desires for vengeance by responding to
wrongdoing through the institution of punishment.29 It is not just that the
institution of punishment has a close relationship to feelings of resentment,
but it is also that a core purpose of criminal law and punishment is to
sublimate them, displace them, and provide an outlet for them. Whether
criminal law succeeds or fails in a society depends, not entirely of course
but importantly, on how well it responds to punitive emotions of its
27. Id.
28. Parts of the discussion below draw from Youngjae Lee, Desert and the Eighth
Amendment, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 101 (2008).
29. For a particularly cogent statement of this view, see John Gardner, Crime: In
Proportion and in Perspective, in FUNDAMENTALS OF SENTENCING THEORY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR
OF ANDREW VON HIRSCH 31, 31-33 (Andrew Ashworth & Martin Wasik eds., 1998). See also
EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOUR IN SOCIETY 11-174 (W. D. Halls trans., Free Press
1984) (1933). For an excellent, and appropriately critical, discussion of Durkheim's views, see
DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY: A STUDY IN SOCIAL THEORY 28-35
(1990). For common statements of these views, see, for example, LACEY, supra note 20, at 34;
WILLIAM WILSON, CENTRAL ISSUES IN CRIMINAL THEORY 74-76 (2002).
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citizens."z Of course, there are ways to understand the role of criminal law
that may better fit our self-image as a modem, civilized society, such as
deterrence and rehabilitation; some may also think that a modem state
should play no role in reproducing primitive, barbaric, uncivilized
sentiments like vengeance. It is true that these emotions can sometimes be
ugly and disturbing, and it is also true that criminal law serves other
functions. However, it would be misguided to lose sight of the ways in
which our institution of punishment both shapes and responds to people's
punitive emotions and the ways in which such interactions lie at the very
core of criminal law, and are not a mere incidence of it.31 All the great
compliance-promoting benefits of empirical desert that Robinson refers to
can be lost if the people feel that the state is doing an inadequate job of
responding to their desires for vengeance, and the success of "empirical
desert" as an instrument for fighting crime depends on the state's ability to
manage such emotions. It seems to me that Robinson's decision to distance
himself from "vengeful desert" carries the cost of obscuring this crucial
relationship.
In addition, it is unrealistic to separate the idea of vengeance and its
associated emotions from desert judgments in criminal law. The difficulty is
that desert judgments in the context of punishment indicate not just
disapproval, which may be formed from a distance and in a cold,
rationalistic, judgmental manner, but also an emotive state. Emotions
associated with the practice of blaming are, for example, anger, resentment,
indignation, and hatred.32 Such emotions may be thought to be subjective or
irrational in that they can get "out of hand," but because of their cognitive
content they can be evaluated as appropriate or inappropriate, rational or
30. Gardner, supra note 29, at 33 ("[T]he criminal law's medicine must be strong enough
to control the toxins of bitterness and resentment which course through the veins of those who
are wronged, or else the urge to retaliate in kind will persist unchecked.").
31. Id. at 33-38.
32. See Jean Hampton, Forgiveness, Resentment, and Hatred, in FORGIVENESS AND
MERCY 35, 54-79 (Jeffrie G. Murphy & Jean Hampton eds., 1988) [hereinafter Hampton,
Forgiveness, Resentment, and Hatred]; Jean Hampton, The Retributive Idea, in FORGIVENESS
AND MERCY, supra, at 143-47; see also ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 79-
81 (Knud Haakonssen ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2002) (1759); Peter Strawson, Freedom and
Resentment, in FREE WILL 72, 75-80, 90-93 (Gary Watson ed., 2003). For a subtle discussion
of such feelings, both pointing out their importance for understanding the institution of
punishment and warning us against complacently accepting them as moral sentiments as
opposed to expressions of cruelty, see GARLAND, supra note 29, at 61-67.
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irrational.33 When such emotions are felt, their appropriateness can be
judged through reflection, and sometimes inappropriately felt emotions
even disappear once there is a recognition of such inappropriateness, the
way, for instance, anger at a friend based on a misunderstanding can
evaporate once the misunderstanding is corrected. But it would be a mistake
to ignore the fact that such emotions are emotions, part of what Peter
Strawson called a "complicated web of attitudes and feelings which form an
essential part of the moral life as we know it,"34 and they are too bound up
with our intuitions of desert to be neatly separated out and hidden away
somewhere.
It is precisely for all the same reasons that it is important to put various
deontological constraints in place when operating a criminal justice
system.35 As noted above, when we punish, we blame, condemn, and
stigmatize the offenders as recipients of blame and punishment.36 Even
though it is commonly stated that our criminal justice system judges acts,
not people, we cannot make sense of the practice of blaming if we try to
think about it exclusively in terms of wrong acts that are detached from
actors. Blaming actors for what they have done implies that the acts that
they have engaged in "reflect badly" on them.37 As John Gardner once put
it, "[t]he criminal law gets personal."38 Because the-practice of placing
33. See R. JAY WALLACE, RESPONSIBILITY AND THE MORAL SENTIMENTS 11-12, 18-19
(1994); Hampton, Forgiveness, Resentment, and Hatred, supra note 32, at 54 ("Resentment
is... more than instinctive rage following an attack: it is an idea-ridden response."); cf
MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST, SHAME, AND THE LAW 24-31
(2004); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT: THE INTELLIGENCE OF EMOTIONS
19-88 (2001); BERNARD WILLIAMS, Morality and the Emotions, in PROBLEMS OF THE SELF:
PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 1956-72, at 207, 224 (1973).
34. Strawson, supra note 32, at 91.
35. Cf Lee, supra note 10, at 680-85.
36. GEORGE SHER, IN PRAISE OF BLAME 7 (2006); BERNARD WILLIAMS, Nietzsche's
Minimalist Moral Psychology, in MAKING SENSE OF HUMANITY AND OTHER PHILOSOPHICAL
PAPERS 65, 72 (1995) ("Blame needs an occasion-an action-and a target-the person who
did the action and who goes on from the action to meet the blame."); cf FEINBERG, supra note
16, at 55, 61.
37. For a more detailed discussion of the relevance of character in judging culpability, see
YoungJae Lee, Recidivism as Omission: A Relational Account, 87 TEX. L. REV. 571, 578-83
(2009).
38. John Gardner, On the General Part of the Criminal Law, in PHILOSOPHY AND
CRIMINAL LAW: PRINCIPLE AND CRITIQUE 205, 236-37 (Antony Duff ed., 1998) ("To be
convicted of a crime is to be criticized, or even sometimes condemned, as a person."); SHER,
supra note 36, at 7 (stating that blame has the structure of a reaction "to a person on the basis of
the wrongness of what he has done," as opposed to a reaction "to the wrongness of what a
1148 [Ariz. St. L.J.
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blame in punishment is of such a "personal" nature, the state must ensure
that its acts of condemning are fair to, and are in fact deserved by, their
recipients. Neither should the state blame offenders more than what they
deserve simply because doing so would be expedient as a matter of
deterrence or incapacitation.39 We need to be especially careful because of
the relationship we noted above between state punishment and vengeance.
Punitive passions may be correctly generated by one's sense that a moral
wrong has been done, but they can also be excessive and driven by other
less desirable, yet no less common, sentiments such as cruelty, sadism,
inhumanity, and racial hatred and prejudice.4" On top of all this, the state
faces tremendous pressures to reduce the incidence of crime. Unless we
treat the constraint against punishing people more than they deserve as close
to inviolable, desert-based limitations on criminalization and punishment
will give way all too often. I am worried that Robinson's rejection of
"deontological desert" may leave his endorsement of desert insufficiently
robust to withstand numerous pressures sure to be placed on it.
None of this is to deny the validity of Robinson's core claims about the
need to tie desert assessments close to ordinary intuitions and the substantial
crime control benefits to be derived when the state can successfully
command respect as a moral authority. The point, rather, is that Robinson's
"empirical desert" needs "vengeful desert" and "deontological desert" to
succeed and his attempts to make his proposal resistant to the usual anti-
retributivist objections by jettisoning the latter two may in the end hurt his
project more than help.
person has done"); VICTOR TADROS, CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 48 (2005) ("In holding an agent
responsible for an action, we imply that the action reflects on the agent in some way.").
39. Cf Lee, supra note 10, at 708 n.147.
40. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALITY 43-49 (Keith Ansell-
Pearson ed., Carol Diethe trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1994) (1887).
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